Abstract-In a ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme, the original signer delegates the power of signing messages to a designated proxy group of n members. Any t or more proxy signers of the group can cooperatively issue a proxy signature on behalf of the original signer, but ðt À 1Þ or less proxy signers cannot. Previously, all of the proposed threshold proxy signature schemes have been based on the discrete logarithm problem and do not satisfy all proxy requirements. In this paper, we propose a practical, efficient, and secure ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem. Our scheme satisfies all proxy requirements and uses only a simple Lagrange formula to share the proxy signature key. Furthermore, our scheme requires only 5 percent of the computational overhead and 8 percent of the communicational overhead required in Kim's scheme.
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INTRODUCTION
I N traditional digital signature schemes [8] , [11] , [22] , a legal user can use her/his private key to sign a message. Any recipient of the signed message can verify the signature by using the signer's public key. However, when the original signer is traveling on business or on vacation and wishes to delegate the power of signing messages to a designated person during her/his absence, traditional signature schemes would see their limit. Fortunately, the proxy signature technology provides a good solution to this problem. The technology allows proxy signers to sign messages on behalf of the original signer without exposing the original signer's private key.
In the history of proxy signature technological development, the ð1; nÞ threshold proxy signature technique was the first to come. In ð1; nÞ proxy signature schemes [16] , [17] , [24] , a legal proxy signature can be generated by a designated proxy signer by using a proxy signing key. The proxy signing key is computed from the original signer's private key, but the private key should not be computed from the proxy signing key in any way. In the eye of a modern user, such schemes are simple but not flexible.
In order to extend proxy signature schemes to fit various practical situations, many ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature schemes have been proposed [13] , [15] , [23] , [26] . For example, we have ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature schemes that allow any t or more proxy signers from a designated group of n members to cooperatively sign messages while ðt À 1Þ or less members cannot generate the legal proxy signature. In practice, the original signer can flexibly choose the threshold t. The approach agrees with ð1; nÞ, ðt; nÞ, and ðn; nÞ threshold delegations. Moreover, a practical and secure threshold proxy signature scheme must satisfy the following requirements [13] , [23] , which we shall call proxy requirements throughout the rest of the paper:
. Secrecy. The original signer's private key is very important. It must be kept secret. If it is discovered, the security of the system is ruined. Therefore, the system must ensure that the private key never gets derived from any information such as the sharing of the proxy signing key or the original signer's public key. Furthermore, no proxy signers should be able to cooperatively derive the original signer's private key. . Proxy protected. Only a delegated proxy signer can generate his partial proxy signature. Even the original signer cannot masquerade as a proxy signer to generate a partial proxy signature. This property protects the authority of the proxy signer. . Unforgeability. A valid proxy signature can only be cooperatively generated by t or more proxy signers. Nondelegated signers have no capability to generate a valid proxy signature. Also, ðt À 1Þ or less proxy signers have no capability of forging a valid proxy signature. . Nonrepudiation. Any valid proxy signature must be generated by t or more proxy signers. The verifier can make sure that the signed message is a correct one by using the proxy signing keys. The original signer cannot deny having delegated the power of signing messages to the proxy signers. Furthermore, the proxy signers cannot deny that they haved signed the message. . Time constraint. The proxy signing keys can be used only during a stipulated period. Once expired, proxy signing keys become invalid; as a result, the signing capability of the proxy signers disappears. However, the original signer's private key can be repeatedly used. This is more suitable for use in the real world. . Known signers. For internal auditing purposes, the system is able to identify the actual signers in the proxy group. Among the best-known threshold proxy signature schemes [13] , [15] , [23] , [26] , only Sun's scheme [23] satisfies all of the requirements described above. However, Sun's scheme uses a verifiable secret sharing scheme [20] to share a random number among a group. Therefore, it is necessary for the proxy group to perform several modular exponential computations and communications to obtain and verify a shared secret. Furthermore, Hwang et al. [12] have shown that Sun's scheme has a security weakness. An adversary can impersonate a legal proxy signer to generate a proxy signature and the real proxy signer cannot deny having signed the proxy signature.
In this paper, we shall propose a new ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem. Our new scheme only requires the Lagrange formula [5] , [10] to share the proxy signing key. The RSA cryptosystem is a popular security technique. Currently, it is widely used in digital signatures, e-commerce, and secure communication. We can easily apply the regular RSA cryptosystem to the proposed scheme without using extra cryptographic techniques. Furthermore, the pair of RSA keys can be repeatedly used. Each user only holds one pair of RSA keys to do e-commerce or secure communication or to carry out the threshold proxy signature scheme. Moreover, our scheme can fully satisfy the proxy requirements, and the overhead is smaller than those of the existing schemes. Therefore, the proposed scheme is practical and efficient.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we will briefly review related work on threshold proxy signature schemes. These reviewed schemes do not yet satisfy all of the proxy requirements. In Section 3, we propose a new ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem. In Section 4, the security of our proposed scheme is analyzed and we compare our scheme with related work. In Section 5, we provide same possible applications. Finally, we summarize the benefits of our scheme in the last section of the paper.
RELATED WORKS
Generally speaking, proxy signature schemes are classified into three delegation types: full delegation, partial delegation, and delegation by warrant [13] . In full delegation schemes, the original signer gives her/his signing key to a proxy signer. Therefore, when the proxy signer signs a message, she/he uses a signature identical to the one created and held by the original signer. This full delegation approach is not secure since the original signer has to reveal her/his private key to the proxy signer. If the proxy signer uses the private key to sign a message against the will of the original signer, then the original signer still has to take all the responsibility because she/he cannot prove that the signature is issued by the proxy signer.
In the partial delegation schemes [16] , [17] , [24] , a proxy signer is given a proxy signing key which is computed from the original signer's private key. The proxy signer has the capability to sign on behalf of the original signer, but from the proxy signing key the proxy signer cannot recover the original signer's private key.
The idea of delegation by warrant in proxy signature schemes was first proposed in [18] , [25] . The warrant contains important information such as the validity period of the delegation, the identities of the original signer and the proxy signers, and the generated proxy verification key. The original signer signs the warrant with her/his private key and publishes the signature on the warrant. Then, the original signer delivers the proxy signing key to the designated proxy signers in a secure manner. The proxy signer can use the proxy signing key to sign a message on behalf of the original signer. According to the warrant, any verifier can verify whether or not the signature has expired or is signed by a legal proxy signer.
Compared with the full delegation approach, partial delegation and delegation by warrant are more secure approaches. To be more specific, the partial delegation approach usually has a higher processing speed, but delegation by warrant is more practical than partial delegation. For example, the signing capability of the proxy signer should disappear when the proxy period expires. However, the partial delegation approach cannot achieve the goal efficiently.
Recently, Kim et al. have combined partial delegation with delegation by warrant and proposed two new types of delegation systems called partial delegation with warrant and ðt; nÞ threshold delegation [13] . In the partial delegation by warrant approach, the proxy signing key is computed from both the original signer's private key and the warrant. However, it is very difficult to recover the original signer's private key from the proxy signing key and the warrant. In the ðt; nÞ threshold delegation approach, the partial delegation approach is further extended. The technology allows an original signer not to only delegate the power of proxy signing to a proxy signer but also to delegate the power to a group of n proxy signers. Furthermore, the original signer can choose the threshold value t freely within the range 1 <¼ t <¼ n. Only t or more proxy signers of the group can cooperatively create a valid proxy signature. Therefore, the threshold proxy signature approach is more practical and secure than other types of proxy signature schemes.
The concept of threshold cryptosystems was brought up by Desmedt and Frankel [6] . They adapted the ElGamal [8] public key cryptosystem and used Lagrange interpolation or geometry to produce the shadows. Kim et al. also built their proxy signature scheme upon the concept of threshold cryptosystems. So far, to the best of our knowledge, all existing ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature schemes [13] , [15] , [23] , [26] are based on the discrete logarithm and require a secret random number to be shared among the proxy group members. Among these threshold signature schemes, Kim et al.'s scheme is augmented with the nonrepudiation property so that any verifier can identify the proxy group, but Zhang's scheme [26] is not. Furthermore, Kim proposed two types of threshold proxy signature schemes, which were the proxy-protected scheme and the proxy-unprotected scheme. In the proxy protected scheme, the original signer cannot impersonate a proxy signer to issue a valid proxy signature. The proxy signing key combines the original signer's secret sharing key and a secret value among the t proxy signers. Therefore, the original signer cannot obtain the proxy signing keys. This property is called proxy-protected. One major drawback in Kim et al.'s scheme is that the actual signers cannot be identified. This can be very inconvenient for internal auditing.
In order to remedy the problem of unknown signers, Sun [23] revised Kim et al.'s proxy-protected type threshold proxy signature scheme and made the actual signers able to be identified. Though Sun's scheme satisfies all proxy requirements listed in Section 1, it has been proven that the scheme is insecure since any n À 1 proxy signers in the group can conspire to obtain the secret key needed by the remainder of the group [12] . Also, the computational and communicational overhead of Sun's scheme is high. With t or more proxy signers needed to cooperatively issue a proxy signature, they have to generate and share a random number among them, and that requires several expansion modular exponential computations and communications [20] , [21] .
In this paper, we propose a new ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem. In the typical RSA digital signature scheme [22] , a RSA modulus N ¼ p Â q is publicly known, where p and q are two secret large primes. The security of RSA makes it difficult to factor N into p and q. A signer randomly chooses a private signing key d and computes its corresponding public verification key e such that d Â e ¼ 1 mod 0ðNÞ, where 0ðNÞ ¼ ðp À 1Þ Â ðq À 1Þ. For a simple ðn; nÞ proxy signature approach [3] , [9] based on the RSA cryptosystem, the original signer randomly selects the proxy signing keys d i , such that P n i¼1 ðd i Þ mod 0ðNÞ ¼ d. Then, the original signer delivers d i to each proxy signer i. To sign a message m, the partial proxy signature s i of m is created by the proxy signer i, where s i ¼ m d i mod N. Then, a combiner, who may be the secretary of the original signer, collects s i , and obtains the proxy signature S from S ¼ Q n i¼1 ðs i Þ mod N. The proxy signers sign messages without revealing the proxy signing key d i . However, this method is not flexible since it always requires n out of n proxy signers to cooperatively issue a proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. Also, the method does not fully satisfy the proxy requirements.
In 1991, Denmedt and Frankel proposed a threshold RSA signature scheme [7] . This technique allows t out of n individuals to generate a signature for a message. The signature is on behalf of the group of n members, hence, we also call it group signature. In this paper, we extend the concepts and principles from Denmedt and Frankel's threshold RSA signature scheme to develop a threshold RSA proxy signature scheme. Our scheme allows t out of n proxy signers to generate a signature on behalf of the original signer. Furthermore, our scheme satisfies all of the proxy requirements and is more efficient.
3 A NEW ðt; nÞ THRESHOLD PROXY SIGNATURE SCHEME BASED ON THE RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this section, we describe a new ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem. There are three types of participants in our scheme: the original signer, the n proxy signers, and a combiner. The original signer allows a group of n proxy signers to sign a message. The combiner can be the secretary of the original signer. The proposed threshold proxy signature scheme can be divided into three phases:
1. the proxy sharing phase, 2. the proxy signature issuing phase, and 3. the verification phase. In the proxy key generation phase, the original signer computes the partial proxy signing keys from his private key and sends them to each designated proxy signer. In the proxy signature issuing phase, the proxy signers cooperatively create a valid signature on a message M. In the verification phase, the verifier can identify not only the original signer, but also the actual signers. For the rest of this paper, P 0 stands for the original signer and P 1 ; P 2 ; Á Á Á ; P n stand for the n proxy signers. N i is a public RSA modulus for public key e i using the ordinary RSA cryptosystem. The message m w stands for a warrant that is minted by the original signer and it contains important information such as the validity period of the proxy key, the identities of the proxy signers, and the original signer, etc. The details of the new ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme are described as follows.
The Proxy Sharing Phase
Assume that an original signer P 0 delegates the power to sign messages to n members during a stipulated period. The steps to generate the proxy key are as follows:
1. (Proxy generation). P 0 generates the group proxy signature key D and its corresponding proxy verification key E, where
Then, P 0 publishes fm w ; E;
(Proxy sharing). P 0 randomly generates a secret polynomial f of degree t À 1, of the form
where a 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a tÀ1 are random numbers. 
The Proxy Signature Issuing Phase
Assume that any t or more proxy signers out of the designated group of n members want to cooperatively sign a message M on behalf of P 0 . Let T denote these group members. The steps of the proxy signature issuing phase are listed as follows:
1. Each member of T signs the message M with his partial proxy signing key k i , where i 2 T . The partial proxy signature s i for each actual proxy signer P i is computed as
Then, each actual proxy signer sends f½s i di mod N i ; s i g to the combiner. 2. The combiner verifies the s i using the public key of the proxy signer P i , i 2 T , and collects ½s i di mod N i . And, the proxy signature S on message M can be generated using the following equation from the Lagrange formula:
In this phase, the proxy signers sign the message without revealing their secret partial proxy signing keys.
The Verification Phase
The parameters N i , e i , m w , and E are publicly known.
1. First, any receiver computes m w and E with the original signer's public key. Then, the receiver checks the validity of the stipulated period. If the period has expired, the proxy verification key is invalid. 2. The receiver can then verify that the message M was signed on behalf of the original signer with the proxy verification key E as shown in the following equation:
DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we examine the security of this scheme and compare our scheme with Kim et al.'s scheme.
Property Analysis
Secrecy
In our scheme, both signing and encrypting are based on the RSA cryptosystem. In the RSA scheme, any party's private key d i and 0ðN i Þ must be kept secret. From the public key, no one can derive the corresponding private key. The security of RSA is based on the difficulty of factoring the RSA modulus N. Furthermore, we also cannot compute the original signer's private key from the group proxy signature key D ¼ d m w 0 mod 0ðN 0 Þ since the parameters d 0 and 0ðN 0 Þ are unknown. Even if t out of n proxy signers collaborate to deliver the group proxy signature key, without 0ðN 0 Þ they cannot calculate the original signer's private key d 0 . Therefore, in our scheme, the original signer's private key can always be kept secret and used repeatedly.
In the Lagrange interpolating polynomial, the polynomial of degree t À 1 requires t or more proxy signers to reconstruct the secret polynomial f. This enforces that we need any t or more proxy signers to reconstruct the proxy signature key D ¼ fð0Þ, but t À 1 or less proxy signers cannot. Furthermore, when the stipulated period has expired, the proxy signature key becomes invalid. Therefore, our scheme meets the property of secrecy.
Proxy Protected
In our scheme, the partial proxy signing key k i is calculated by the original signer. Hence, the original signer can compute the partial proxy signature s i from (4). However, the original signer cannot generate a valid signature for s i on behalf of P i since the original signer does not know P i 's private key d i . The combiner does not accept the partial proxy signature s i when the received signature of s i is incorrect. Therefore, the original signer has no ability to substitute for proxy signers. The property of proxy protection is fulfilled in our scheme.
Unforgability
Each member only knows a secret share fðiÞ of the polynomial f. Therefore, only the designated group of n proxy signers can sign messages. Without the proxy signature key k i , no one can forge the proxy signer P i to create s i and pass the verification.
Furthermore, as in Lagrange interpolation, the polynomial of degree t À 1 such that t À 1 or less proxy signers cannot reconstruct the polynomial to get fð0Þ ¼ D. Without D, no one can forge a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. We also cannot deliver the partial proxy signing key k i from s i in (4). The security is the result of the difficulty in calculating discrete logarithms. Therefore, our scheme ensures that a valid proxy signature can be generated only when t or more proxy signers cooperatively sign the message.
Nonrepudiation
In the property of nonrepudiation, both the original signer and the actual proxy signers cannot deny having signed the proxy signature. From the signature ½s i di mod N i , P i cannot deny having signed the partial proxy signature because only P i has the private key d i . Therefore, any verifier can identify the actual signers. Furthermore, the proxy verification key E is signed with the original signer's private key. The original signer cannot deny having delegated the power of signing to the proxy signers. The proxy signature is equivalent to the signature of the original signer.
Time Constraint
In this scheme, the warrant records the stipulated period of this proxy. In the verification phase, the verifier checks whether or not the warrant has expired. The information in the warrant m w can be trusted because it is signed by the original signer. If the period has expired, the proxy verification key E becomes invalid. If a proxy signature was generated using the overdue proxy signature keys, the verification of the proxy signature would fail. This is very practical because, when the original signer returns from his business travel, the proxy signing key becomes invalid and the capability of signing messages on behalf of the original signer disappears.
Known Signer
For auditing purposes, the combiner needs to know who actually signs a message. This mechanism improves the responsibility of each proxy signer. In our scheme, each proxy signer sends the partial proxy signature to the combiner, who must append the proxy signer's signature. The combiner can verify the signature using the signer's public key e i . Therefore, we can identify the actual signer.
Comparisons
In research relating to threshold proxy signatures, this concept was first proposed by Kim et al. [13] . They defined the requirements of the threshold proxy signature and presented a secure method which satisfied the requirements. However, in Kim et al.'s scheme, the actual signers are unknown. This is very inconvenient for internal auditing. Sun improved upon Kim et al.'s scheme so that actual signers can be identified [23] ; however, there is a security weakness [12] . For this reason, we only compare our scheme with Kim et al.'s scheme [13] . Kim et al.'s scheme consists of the random number generation phase, the proxy sharing phase, and the proxy signature issuing and verification phase. To clarify the comparison, the processes are briefly described as follows.
Kim's Scheme
Step 1. The random number generation phase.
Kim et al.'s ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme requires a protocol [20] , [21] to generate a random number among the group without the dealer. Let P 0 be the original signer and P 1 ; P 2 ; Á Á Á ; P n be the n proxy signers of the proxy group.
1. Each proxy signer P i selects a secret polynomial of degree t À 1 such that
where r i , a i;1 ; a i;2 ; Á Á Á ; a i;n are random numbers. If we ignore the overhead for creating a random number, it requires a total of n polynomial generations for n proxy signers. 2. Then, each P i computes f i ðjÞ mod q and sends it to P j for all 1 j n and j 6 ¼ n. Furthermore, P i computes g ri ; g ai;1 ; g ai;2 Á Á Á ; g ai;tÀ1 ðmod pÞ ð 9Þ
and broadcasts them. Since each proxy signer has to calculate and transmit f i ðjÞ to other ðn À 1Þ proxy signers, it requires n Â ðn À 1Þ polynomial computations and transmissions. Also, it requires n Â t modular exponential computations and n Â t broadcasts for (9). 3. After receiving f j ðiÞ ðfor j ¼ 1; Á Á Á ; n; and j 6 ¼ iÞ, P i confirms the validity of f j ðiÞ by checking whether or not g f j ðiÞ satisfies the following equation:
Each proxy signer performs the verification ðn À 1Þ times and each verification requires t modular exponential computations and ðt À 1Þ modular multiplications. Thus, this step requires n Â ðn À 1Þ Â t modular exponential computations and n Â ðn À 1Þ Â ðt À 1Þ modular multiplications.
If the verifications in
Step 3 hold, each P i computes the secret share . . .
It is assumed that additional computational overhead can be ignored. To calculate both equations, n Â t Â ðt À 1Þ modular multiplications are required. In total, the following computations are required:
. n polynomial generations, . n Â ðn À 1Þ polynomial computations, . n 2 Â t modular exponential computations, and . n 2 Â ðt À 1Þ þ n Â ðt À 1Þ 2 modular multiplications.
Furthermore, the following communications are required:
. n Â ðn À 1Þ transmissions and . n Â t broadcasts.
Step 2. The proxy sharing phase.
1. (Group key generation) . First, the proxy group must execute the above protocol to obtain the share s i and the public outputs y G ¼ g a 0 mod p, A j ¼ g a j ðmod pÞ, where j ¼ 1; 2; Á Á Á ; t À 1.
(Proxy generation). The original signer computes
K ¼ g k mod p and e ¼ hðm w ; KÞ, where k is a random number, m w is a warrant, and hðÞ is a one-way hash function. After this, P 0 computes ' ¼ e Â x 0 þ k mod q, where x 0 is a private key of the original signer. Therefore, the original signer requires one modular exponential computation, one modular multiplication, and one hash function computation. 3. (Proxy sharing). P 0 randomly chooses a polynomial such that
where b 1 ; b 2 ; Á Á Á ; b tÀ1 are random numbers. Then, P 0 computes f 0 ðiÞ and sends it to each P i in a secret manner. P 0 also computes
and publishes m w ; K; B 1 ; B 2 ; Á Á Á ; B tÀ1 ðmod pÞ. Therefore, this step requires one polynomial generation, n polynomial computations, and t À 1 modular exponential computations. Also, P 0 needs to broadcast t þ 1 parameters and deliver n parameters to each proxy signer. 
where y 0 is the original signer's public key. If it holds, each proxy signer P i computes the proxy sharing '
For all proxy signers, n Â ðt þ 1Þ modular exponential computations, n Â ðt þ 1Þ modular multiplications, and n hash function computations are required. In total, the following computations are required:
. n þ 1 hash function computations. Also, the following communications are required:
. n 2 transmissions and . n Â t þ t þ 1 broadcasts.
Step 3. The proxy signature issuing and verification phases.
1.
The t or more actual signers have to execute the random number generation phase to obtain the secret output s 0 i and public outputs y ¼ g c0 ,
where
The procedure requires t polynomial generations, ðt 2 À tÞ polynomial computations, t 3 modular exponential computations, and 2t 3 À 3t 2 þ t modular multiplications. It also requires t 2 À t parameter transmissions and t 2 parameter broadcasts. 2. Then, each actual signer uses his proxy signature key to issue a partial proxy signature such that e 0 ¼ hðy; mÞ and i ¼ s
, where m is the message. Then, each actual signer reveals i . This step requires t modular multiplications, t hash function computations, and t transmissions. 3. Everyone can verify the validity of j by the following equation: 
The verification requires three modular exponential computations, two modular multiplications, and two hash function computations.
The total computational and communicational overheads of Kim et al.'s scheme are summarized in Table 1 and  Table 2 , respectively.
Our Proposed Scheme
In our proposed scheme, a mechanism to share a number among the group is not required. The computational and communicational overheads of the proxy sharing phase are described as follows:
1. In proxy generation, the original signer generates the group signature key D and its corresponding proxy verification key E by using (1) and (2). Then, P 0 publishes fm w ; E; ½m w k E d0 g. These tasks require three modular exponential computations and three broadcasts. 2. In proxy sharing, the original signer computes the shares of all proxy signers. This requires one polynomial generation, n polynomial computations, 2n modular exponential computations, and n transmissions of keys. 3. In proxy share generation, each proxy signer can obtain and validate the proxy share. It requires 2n modular exponential computations. In total, the following computations are required:
. one polynomial generation, . n polynomial computations, and . 4n þ 3 modular exponential computations.
. n transmissions and . three broadcasts. In the proxy signature issuing and verification phases, the required computations and communications are described as follows:
1. Each actual signer executes (4) and (5) to issue the partial proxy signature and sends ½s i d i to the combiner. This step requires 2t modular exponential computations, t 2 modular multiplications, and t transmissions. 2. Then, the combiner verifies the digital signature of all s i which requires t modular exponential computations. The generation of S on M requires t À 1 modular multiplications. 3. To verify the proxy signature, the verifier first checks the validity of the warrant which requires one modular exponential computation, and then verifies whether or not the message is signed on behalf of the original signer as shown in (7). This requires one modular exponential computation. The total computations in the proxy signature issuing and verification phases are listed below:
. 3t þ 2 modular exponential computations and . t 2 þ t À 1 modular multiplications.
And, the communicational is
The overall computational and communicational overheads of both schemes are summarized in Table 1 and  Table 2 , respectively. For comparison purposes, we consider a ð5; 10Þ threshold proxy signature scheme and assume that the modulus of the two schemes are all 512 bits, the overhead of each computation and communication is one unit, and the problem of overflow is ignored. For n ¼ 10 and t ¼ 5, the computations are 100 and 2; 020 for our scheme and Kim et al.'s scheme, respectively. The communicational overheads are 221 and 18 for our scheme and Kim et al.'s scheme, respectively. Note that, although Kim et al.'s scheme does not identify the signer's identity and ours does, our scheme is still far superior. The overheads of our 
APPLICATIONS
In this section, we outline some applications of ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature in the areas of mobile agent and electronic contract.
Mobile Agent
The mobile agent offers a new computing paradigm and becomes increasingly important for the applications of electronic commerce, virtual enterprises, and distributed database systems. The technology allows an agent in the form of software programs, data, or execution state that acts on behalf of its owner to perform one or more tasks autonomously and return the results to the agent owner. Furthermore, the mobile agent is developed for the use in open, distributed, and heterogeneous environments, thus it can migrate across the Internet and resume execution on a remote computer. With the features of mobility and autonomy, the mobile agent has been widely used in many applications such as electronic purses, electronic payment, information retrieval, and negotiation systems to achieve higher efficiency at lower costs [4] , [19] . In a word, the mobile agent has such advantages as conserving network bandwidth, reducing network latency, asynchrony, and dynamic adaptation. However, the security threats are still the deployment bottleneck. For instances, the private keys and the confidential information carried by the agent are very difficult to protect in a hostile execution environment. If a mobile agent can sign a message on behalf of the agent owner (customer) in a remote server (Vendor) without revealing customer's private key, the mobile agent can be used not only to search for special products or services, but also to sign a contract with the vendor [14] . Fortunately, the ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature technology provides a good solution to this problem. It can be used to construct a secure mobile agent. The customer can delegate the power of signing messages to a designated agent. Consequently, the agent can issue a proxy signature on behalf of the customer without revealing the customer's private key. For example, a flight booking agent can work on behalf of a customer to search for a lower price ticket and book it by digital signature. The functions of the agent can include browsing products, gathering shopping information, and analyzing collected information from the vendors. Besides, our technology can also be applied in multiagent systems [14] . A customer can delegate signing power to n designated agents. The agents can have different goals and try to make a good decision without concerning the global decisions. In this case, when t or more agents come to the same decision, then the transaction is valid. Multiagent technology can futhermore reduce the burden of human's effort and can be great help for decision makers.
Electronic Contract
The concept of ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature also can be used when there are electronic contracts to sign [1] . In electronic contract systems, the handwritten signatures have to be replaced with digital signatures. However, in traditional digital signature schemes, a message can be signed only by a legal signer with her/his private key. If a customer directly delivers her/his private key to a broker to sign a contract with a vendor, then the private key is no longer secure. As for our approach, it fits the usage scenarios of electronic contract. Our approach allows a customer to delegate her/his power to a broker to work on behalf of the customer and negotiate with vendors and, finally, make a contract with the victorious vendor. In the contract-making process, the customer's private key does not leak out. For making a contract discreetly, the customer can also choose to delegate the signing capability to n designated brokers so that only when t or more brokers sign the contract with the same vendor can the contract be valid.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we have proposed a practical, efficient, and secure ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme based on the RSA cryptosystem. According to previous discussions, our scheme significantly reduces the cost of computation and communication. Our scheme does not require a protocol to generate a random number. It only takes the ordinary RSA digit signature scheme [22] and the Lagrange formula [2] for a signature receiver to obtain and verify the proxy signature. Therefore, our scheme not only meets all of the requirements of proxy signature, but it is also more efficient than existing threshold proxy signature schemes. In summary, our scheme possesses the following abilities:
. the ability to flexibly choose the threshold number t, . the ability to repeatedly use the participant's RSA key pairs which can also be used in other work, . the ability to put time constraints on the threshold delegation, and . the ability to identify the actual signers.
